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The recent publication of Michael Thompson's Labor Without Class 
and Katherine Betts' The Great Divide l has re-focussed attention upon 
claims that there exists a powerful "new class" in Australian society 
comprised of tertiary-educated, left-wing activist intellectuals, trade 
unionists, public servants and lobbyists. This paper provides a 
background to the thesis of the new class, arguing that it constitutes 
the central organising idea of a new class discourse, which 
encompasses such ideas as 'political correctness', 'special interests' 
and the 'guilt industry'. Both the thesis of the new class and new 
class discourse are key discursive and conceptual features of 
contemporary right-wing political thought in Australia. As rhetorical 
devices employed in the context of the hegemonic struggles within 
Australian society of the 1990s, new class discourse de-legitimates 
the interests of the labour movement and other social movements, 
thus working to exclude these groups from the sphere of public 
discourse and the legitimate political community. 
From the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth 
century, the tenn "new class" has been used by many divergent writers 
and in many different contexts.2 Bakunin, for example predicted that 
a Marxist revolution would result in: 
the reign of scientific intelligence ... a new class, a new hierarchy of 
real and pretended scientists and scholars ... of the State engineers 
who will constitute the new privileged scientific-political class.' 
John Kenneth Galbraith used the term to apply to the rise of a 
non-labouring educated knowledge class in America4 and in the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s a number of left-wing Eastern European 
dissidents such as Milovan Djilas and Ivan Szelenyi, used the term 
to refer to the domination of the European Communist states by a 
Communist Party-based bureaucratic eliteS. However, in order to 
understand the contemporary manifestation of the idea of the new 
class within the Australian Right, it is first necessary to examine its 
historical heritage amongst the American neo-conservative 
intellectuals during the early 1970s. The term neo-conservative refers 
to a specific group of American intellectuals - such as Daniel Bell, 
Irving Kristol, Nathen Glazier, Norman Podhoretz and Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan - who, during the 1960s and 1970s, articulated a particular 
type of Cold War anti-communist conservatism. This motivated the 
neo-conservatives, on the one hand, to critique what was seen as a 
failure of American liberalism - which resulted in the radicalism of 
the 1960s and challenges to the authority of major institutions of 
American society - but on the other hand to defend the cultural and 
political institutions which, they perceived, formed the foundations 
of American liberal democracy. 
The thesis of the new class became a central component of this 
neo-conservative project.6 In 1971 and 1972, a number of articles 
appeared in the journals Commentary and The Public Interest - which 
continue to be key sites for the articulation of neo-conservative 
thought - expounding the idea ofthe new class. The theme of these 
articles was that a "new class" of the fonner educated professional 
middle class had grown and was continuing to grow in the United 
States. This class was politically to the left, antagonistic towards the 
major and traditional institutions of American society and using its 
dominance within the public sphere to pursue its own interests 
at the expense of the national or public interests.1 
Even if members of the new class believed that they were working 
in the best interests of the public, it is argued that the general appeal 
of the new class to the public interest is a mask for sectional interests. 
The neo-conservative authors attribute to the new class a particularly 
"aggressive"8 and "self-righteous"9 style of political discourse and, 
importantly, stress the lack of empathy and cynicism displayed by 
the new class towards the common American worker. Although there 
were differences in accounting for precisely who belongs to this "new 
class" (the term is variously used to refer to "self-designated 
intellectuals",lo employees of the public welfare sector and their trade 
unions ll and "educated, prosperous people, members of the 
professional and technical intelligentsia, and their wives and children, 
academics and their students"12) all the authors demonstrated 
antipathy towards it. 
These ideas recurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s not only 
in Commentary and The Public Interest, but also in neo-conservative 
books, anthologies and other publications. I' The new class thesis 
formed that basis for a critique of sixties radicalism as well as policy 
proposals aimed at promoting equality of outcome and opportunity 
within American society. 
This thesis proved influential amongst Australian right wing 
intellectuals. 14 The first major article by the Australian right that used 
the term new class appears to be Bob Browning's 'Opposition 
business fails to see' printed in The Bulletin in November 1981. In 
it, Browning argues that a new class is developing in Australia, similar 
to that identified by the American neo-conservatives in the United 
States. Browning's new class is anti-capitalist in intent, highly 
organised and existing within public institutions; in this article, he 
attempts to ground the actions of the new class within the structures 
of "post-industrial capitalism", arguing that it is in the interests of 
the new class to attack private enterprise in order to legitimate their 
own positions within the public sphere. To Browning, the major site 
of anti-capitalist organisation in the late twentieth century has shifted 
from blue collar trade unions to the white collar professional publicly 
employed middle class: 
... commercially non-productive white collar sections of the 
community which are the bastions of welfare agencies, tertiary 
education institutions and the more obscurely functioning sections 
of the Public service. IS 
By 1983, it seems, the idea of the new class had gained a 
substantial following amongst the Australian Right, as is evidenced 
by Robert Manne's impromptu speech at the launch of The New 
Conservatism in Australia: 
... by the mid-seventies another layer had been added [to Australian 
society J ... the so-called "new class" of university graduates, the 
products ofthe rapidly expanded tertiary education of the 'sixties. 
They were now present throughout many of the key institutions of 
our society, and were dominant in those - like teaching and 
journalism - where moral and social values were defined and 
disseminated. Their enthusiasms, certainties and causes were 
everywhere to be found. Their hatreds - America, Capitalism, Moral 
Puritanism, Anti-Communism - were expressed rancorously and 
consensually. 16 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the thesis of the new class 
has been employed across the spectrum of right-wing thought; by 
conservatives such as Santamaria and Coleman, 17 economic liberals 
such as McGuinness,18 from within the Labor Party by Peter Walsh 
and Michael Thompsonl9 as well as by the extreme-Right populist 
supporters of Pauline Hanson. 20 
The thesis of the new class gave cohesion to ideas that had been 
fermenting amongst the Australian Right for a number of years. 
Firstly, it tapped into already existing sympathies and antagonisms 
and provided a structural explanation for some ofthe major changes 
that Australian society had experienced during the 1960s and 1970s, 
specifically the campus radicalism of the 1960s, the role of 
intellectuals in post-World War Two Western society. Secondly, it 
complimented core ideas ofthe growing economic liberal world view. 
Like the American neo-conservatives, many within the Australian 
Right were concerned with providing an explanation for the campus 
radicalism of the 1960s. Conservatives were critical of what they 
perceived as an irrational and indulgent rejection of the traditional 
authority of Australia's individualistic, capitalist British heritage. The 
protest movement against the Vietnam War, the Springbok tour of 
Australia and campus radicalism in general were explained in these 
terms. John Carroll, for example, explains the radicalism ofthe sixties 
in terms of a failure of the traditional structures of authority, resulting 
in the middle class university students identifying with the "larger 
than life" New Left figures such as Mao Tse Tung and Che GuevaraY 
As is evident from the earlier statement by Manne, the generation of 
campus radicals who graduated from universities around Australia 
in the 19608 and early 1970s, taking their radical ideologies with 
them into the institutions of the public service, the media, academia 
and trade unions, is viewed as the constituting the beginning of the 
new class. Lachlan Chipman's discussion of the New South Wales 
Teachers' Federation anticipates this new class thesis: 
On a typically hot and humid Sydney evening late in 1980, the 
audience for the ABC's major television news service watched an 
angry group of unionists shouting, or more precisely swearing, at 
the latest salary recommendation of the new South Wales Industrial 
Relations Commission ... viewers saw and heard a foul-mouthed 
rabble of sloppily dressed and grubbily obese unionists ... its 
leadership currently is very much more to the left, and militantly so, 
than most of the others. It embodies the ideological divisions of the 
far left, and is increasingly under the control of the 'new left' 
generation which demonstrated, occupied, defied, confronted, and 
in many cases, cheated its way through Australian universities and 
colleges of higher education in the late 1960s and early 1970s.22 
As the intellectual mentors to the generation of campus radicals, 
intellectuals too have been apportioned blame for the failure of 
traditional authority represented by the sixties. In 1974, John J. Ray 
put this position regarding intellectuals: 
It is their students who go out and fill jobs in the public service and 
the media. Many business leaders and politicians who supposedly 
represent the worker are nowadays university graduates. So after 
three or more years indoctrination, it is no wonder that people who 
have been through university think that the only intellectually 
defensible opinions are radical ones. 23 
This sentiment built upon earlier critiques of intellectuals as being 
sympathetic towards communism.24 During the Vietnam War, this 
resulted in the criticism being levelled at many left-wing academics 
that they were blind to the atrocities of communist regimes, yet were 
prepared to criticise vehemently the governments of their own 
countries. 
The rise of economic liberalism within the Right also 
provided a space for the articulation of the new class thesis. 
Economic liberalism is concerned with critiquing the 
Keynesian state from a perspective of the primacy of the freedom of 
the individual. Its set of policy proposals have revolved around de-
regulation of government services, privatisation and an attack upon 
the power of trade unions. The underlying premises ofthe economic-
liberal world view variously derive their inspiration, if not theoretical 
basis from such thinkers as Friederich von Hayek, James Buchanan 
and the Public Choice School, and Milton Friedman25. A brief 
examination of the work of these thinkers reveals that the thesis of 
the new class is complimentary to their arguments. 
The project of the Public Choice School has been referred to by 
many of its adherents as the "politics of economics".26 It is an 
application ofthe principles ofneo-classical economics to the field 
of political inquiry and relies upon a view of the individual as a 
utility maximizer, who pursues this utility maximization rationally. 
Tullock and Buchanan transpose this view of the individual onto 
governmental structures, such as governmental departments and 
regulatory authorities.27 Thus, bureaucratic activity is reduced to the 
self-interest of powerful bureaucrats. Mancur Olson also critiques 
group political activity, theorising that large groups are unable to 
represent the interests of their members, despite what claims may be 
made by them to the contrary.28 Similarly, von Hayek argues that, 
contrary to the pronouncements made by governments and supporters 
of Keynesian style state intervention, governments are unable to 
satisfy the multitude of demands and preferences of its citizens, and 
indeed are unable to ascertain what these preferences might be.29 
Thus, these economic liberal theories echo the themes, later 
articulated within the new class thesis, of the growth of self-serving 
interest groups and bureaucracies, typically funded by public money. 
Milton and Rose Friedman, in fact, acknowledge their debt to the 
American neo-conservatives and use the term "new class" to refer 
to: 
... government bureaucrats, academics whose research is supported 
by government funds or who are employed in government financed 
'think-tanks', staffs of the many so-called' general interest' or 'public 
policy' groups, journalists and others in the communications 
industry.30 
These approaches to economics and politics formed the intellectual 
core of the growing collection of adherents to economic-liberalism 
within Australia. 31 
Thus the new class thesis was able to be accommodated within 
the intellectual milieu of the Australian Right in the early to mid 
eighties. It complemented both the conservative and the neo-liberal 
world view in Australia. For the neo-liberal, it provided a historical 
framework for the critique of the role of the state and interest groups 
in Australian society, for the conservative it offered an explanation 
for the changes and conflicts in Australian cultural attitudes and 
institutions that were occurring by the mid-l 98Gs. During the 1980s 
and into the nineteen nineties, one of the defining features of right-
wing political discourse in Australia has been the sometimes bitter 
conflict between, broadly, economic liberalism and liberal 
conservatism.32 Despite this conflict, the new class thesis, although 
predominantly employed by conservatives, has been accommodated 
within both world views. 
New class discourse 
The importance of the new class thesis lies beyond its specific 
articulation,by various thinkers on the right. The concept of the new 
class informs a number of critiques of the state, intellectuals, new 
social movements and trade unions. Indeed, it forms the central 
organising concept of a new class discourse that includes such 
rhetorical devices as "political correctness", "special 
interests", the "guilt industry" and the "industrial relations 
club" that has become one of the defining features of contemporary 
right-wing political culture in Australia. New class discourse is a 
specific set of rhetorical devices and associated concepts which 
provides a framework within which the claims about the rights of 
workers, women, the environment and minorities such as Aborigines 
are explained and critiqued. 
"Political correctness" is the most successful popular 
manifestation of new class discourse. Although originally fonnulated 
as an ironic term within the American new left33 , "political 
correctness" became a key rhetorical feature of the American Right's 
portrayal of a "crisis" on US university campuses which revolved 
around an ideological struggle, where radical left-wing, feminist, 
gay and minority academics (the fonner radicals of the sixties), 
having gained control of departments, faculties and administrations, 
disregarded the ideals of traditional American education and abused 
their power to foist their own ideology upon the young minds of 
America. 34 As with the thesis of the new class, the rhetoric and 
associated concepts behind "political correctness" were translated 
into the context of the Australian Right. The terms "political 
correctness" and "PC" have come to be applied to what is portrayed 
as a domination of public discourse by tertiary educated left-wing 
minorities whose opinions do not reflect those of mainstream 
Australia35, and this theme has been popularised through the mass 
media. 
In the concept of "special interests", also, is the underlying notion 
of the new class. The tenn has been used particularly with reference 
to those groups who are perceived to have had power in influencing 
the agenda of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments; groups 
such as non-profit or quasi non-government organisations promoting 
such interests as feminism, multiculturalism, Aboriginal rights and 
environmentalism.36 The tenn itself conveys the sense that these 
interests are distant from the concerns of mainstream Australia, that 
they have had a 'special' power with relation to policy makers and 
that those who promote such special interests, view theirs as deserving 
of more attention than other interests, rights or knowledge claims. 
Significantly, since forming government, John Howard has used the 
idea of "special interests" as a key concept in his rhetorical arsenal 
against the trade union movement. In the context of the Coalition 
government's ongoing process of industrial relations changes, the 
trade union leadership have been labelled as "special interests", and 
indeed, these special interests of the trade union leadership are 
equated with demands of the trade union movement (i.e. the demands, 
claims and campaigns of trade unions are reducible to the interests 
of the union leadership. )37 Similarly, the concept of the "guilt 
industry" is one which was articulated within right-wing political 
culture during the 1980s, and currently fonns a part of the rhetorical 
arsenal of the Coalition government.38 The tenn reflects the twin 
notions of middle class guilt and the economic self-interest of those 
employed on public money as advocates for Aboriginal people as 
being the primary motivating forces for contemporary advocacy of 
issues such as Aboriginal land rights. 
As will be argued later, one of the strengths of the new class 
thesis is its lack of specificity, enabling it to be applied in a number 
of different contexts. This discursive strength is also its analytical 
weakness. Firstly, there is little agreement as to who precisely is a 
member of this new class. Is it, "... those commercially non-
productive white collar sections of the community which are the 
bastions of welfare agencies, tertiary education institutions and the 
more obscurely functioning sections of the Public Service."39? Is it 
" ... teachers, social workers, reformist lawyers (including those 
working in, and on, aboriginal communities), planners of 
various types, basically ... those who are already on a 
government payroll"40? Does it extend into the private sphere, 
as McGuinness suggests41? The major analytical failing of the new 
class thesis is that the key detenninant of new class membership is 
not to be found in social location, but rather in ideological orientation. 
Ironically, it this quasi-Marxist conception of class consciousness 
that is used to define the new class. As Daniel Bell concludes in his 
reflection upon the new class thesis: 
In short, if there is any meaning to the idea of a "new class" ... it 
cannot be located in social structural tenns; it must be found in 
cultural attitudes. It is a mentality, not a class. 42 
For the notion of class to have meaning requires that membership 
criterion of that class be applied universally within social stratas. It 
is clear that across any particular strata that could come under the 
label of 'new class', there are many who do not share the key 
ideological characteristics ascribed to them (for example, across the 
public service, within teacher unions, within the trade union 
leadership or within the professional middle class). 
Therefore, in the context of the new class thesis, the term "class", 
is, it seems, a convenient rather than descriptive label. It suggests 
collusion, individual self-interest and group self-interest; ideas that 
are also implicit in the tenns "special interests" and "guilt industry". 
Thus, what are really at stake in tenns of the new class thesis, and 
indeed the discourse of the new class, are not claims about a class, 
but rather claims about an elite, and crucially, an elite with a particular 
ideological character. The ideological character of these elites is left-
wing and vehemently opposed to both traditional Australian values 
and the present values of mainstream Australia. Policies emanating 
from these elites are derived from the elites' interest in furthering 
their own privilege, and they are elites because they wield political 
power- relative to the power of the people they represent-through 
their organisational positions or by being agenda-setters within the 
public service, the media and government. 
Although there is not the space within this article to offer a 
thorough critique ofthe claims ofthe new class discourse, a number 
of areas for further exploration can be suggested which, if correct, 
undennine its major contentions. Firstly, the discourse itself deserves 
attention. As a discourse, it is self-referential, and little empirical 
evidence is used to justify knowledge claims within the discourse. It 
is also inconsistent in that terms such as new class, political 
correctness and special interests are applied arbitrarily to many 
different and disparate individuals and ideas. Boris Frankel puts it 
succinctly when he writes; 
Culturally, 'new class' is a synonym for class betrayal, hedonistic 
narcissism and nihilism. Structurally, it is a synonym for all that 
inhibits economic growth and the development of Australia as a 
market society. Politically it is a synonym for those social forces 
which, eiectorally, the major parties cannot afford to offend, despite 
the fact that they are supposedly subverting society. 
In other words, 'new class' is a shorthand code for a range of right-
wing attitudes towards the welfare state, contemporary culture, 
Australian history and national identity, Aboriginal rights, feminism, 
environmentalism and multiculturalismY 
The problems and inconsistencies with the term "political 
correctness" for example are well documented.44 
Secondly, the claims implicit within the discourse must be 
evaluated. There is a sense in which the underlying claims of new 
class discourse do have resonance, and that is in the make up of the 
leadership ofthe new social movements, Labor Party and trade unions 
- however the discourse obfuscates a thorough understanding of the 
phenomenon. Burgmann and Milner, for example, describe the ways 
in which the leadership of the new social movements are 
dominated by the middle class, and to a large extent, express 
middle class interests.45 Importantly, it is the material interests 
~~---------------------------
of the middle class which Burgmann and Milner are referring to, 
rather than the radical anti-capitalist agenda ascribed to the new class. 
It is possible to take this analysis further and evaluate the new social 
movements as well as the labour movement in terms of radical 
agendas and radical policy outcomes. The appropriateness of the 
term special interests in relation to the environment movement, for 
example, deserves attention. For whilst this movement undoubtedly 
contains individuals and groups who profess a radical anti-capitalist 
and anti-materialist agenda, the concrete policy initiatives which 
reflect such an agenda are minimal. Further, like other social 
movements, it is a diverse movement accommodating vastly different 
ideologies and approaches to politics. Thus, as Christopher Lasch 
writes, it can be concluded that: 
The hope that "new social movements" would take its place in the 
struggle against capitalism, which briefly sustained the left in the 
late seventies and early eighties, has come to nothing. Not only do 
the new social movements - feminism, gay rights, welfare rights, 
agitation against racial discrimination - have nothing in common, 
but their only coherent demand aims at inclusion in the dominant 
structures rather than at a revolutionary transformation of social 
relations. 46 
Similarly, the role of the trade unions under the Hawke and 
Keating Labor governments can be evaluated against the claims about 
the power of the radical special interests of labour. As Matthews 
argues, major employer groups were successful in transforming the 
agenda of the Accord to one supportive of a shift towards enterprise 
bargaining.47 The Accord tied the trade union movement into a role 
of responsible consultant to government and thus into a period 
characterised by consensus rather than confrontation on the part of 
the unions.48 Such a strategy allowed the ALP to maintain its trade 
union base of financial and electoral support as well as shedding its 
socialist image in favour of an image as responsible and equitable 
managers of a capitalist economy,,9 As Paul Kelly writes: 
Australia's political debate during the late 1980s saw Labor and 
Coalition, business and unions, opinion makers and economic 
institutions, agreed upon the direction - the need for a more 
competitive, flexible, high saving economy, less reliant upon state 
regulation, border protection and arbitral machinery. The real division 
was about the timing, income redistribution and methodology of the 
transformation. 50 
Rather than trade unions exerting their muscle over government, 
the Accord was an example of trade unions tying their fortunes to 
the maintenance of a Labor government. This led to concessions by 
both unions and government, and the results of the Accord owe more 
to the dominant economic structuring power of particular market 
relations than they do to the power of new class special interests. 
Constructing the political community - new class and 
public discourse 
The discourse of the new class is a discourse in the Foucauldian 
sense that it constitutes reality as well as reflecting upon it. 51 Gramsci 
shows how power is exercised through cultural forms and that these 
cultural forms and the public sphere are sites of constant political 
struggle to construct hegemonies. 52 When new class discourse is 
considered in its popular manifestations, it is apparent that it fO[IDs 
part of this political struggle. It constitutes reality in the sense that it 
creates its own objects and to a lesser extent, its own subjects; in this 
case, a set of left-wing elites [objects] who exist in contrast to the 
constructed image of the battler or mainstream Australia [subjects]. 53 
"Special interests" and "political correctness" connote 
subjectivity, ideological bias and a removal from the ordinary. 
The "new class" and the "guilt industry" connote the collusion and 
power of a minority at the expense of the majority. New class 
discourse thus re-works the classical Australian image of the 'battlers 
versus the elites'. 54 In doing this, it positions trade unions, new social 
movements, and others critical of conservative and neo-Iiberal 
agendas, outside of the mainstream. The effect is to de-legitimate 
the knowledge claims of these groups. What constitutes the legitimate 
political community then, is defined through a process of exclusion. 
With the forums of public discourse increasingly monopolised 
by large corporate interests, the question of who speaks on behalf of 
the Australian community, and which communitys' voices and 
interests are represented is a pertinent one. For the labour movement, 
it is carries a particular immediacy. As Gramsci demonstrates, 
ideological leadership is a necessary element of any hegemonic 
process, and it is precisely this kind of leadership which is being 
pursued by John Howard and the Coalition government in the context 
of their industrial relations agenda. 55 As the claims of trade unions 
are de-legitimated through the discourse of the new class, it is the 
image of the individual worker, who will be able to profit, free form 
the stifling interests of the trade union leadership under a system of 
Australian Workplace Agreements, that is promoted by the federal 
government. This hegemonic project undermines an identification 
of Australian workers with the labour movement in favour of 
individualism and an identification with the vague, but antithetical 
image of the battler. 
The new class is an imprecise term at best; at worst it is arbitrary. 
But it is this imprecision which allows it to be mobilised in different 
contexts. As this discourse de-legitimates knowledge claims and the 
rights claims oflabour, social movements and minority groups within 
Australian society, it narrows the scope ofiegitimate public discourse. 
In doing this it also narrows the scope of the political community, 
and contributes to an impoverished rather than a vibrant democratic 
society. 
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